The role of domain restrictions in mechanism design : ex post incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
| Year of publication: |
March 2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Barberà, Salvador ; Berga Colom, Dolors ; Moreno, Bernardo |
| Publisher: |
Barcelona : GSE, Graduate School of Economics |
| Subject: | Mechanisms | Interdependent Types | Ex Post Incentive Compatibility | Strategy Proofness | Pareto Efficiency | Preference Functions | Jury Decisions | Allocation Problems | Auctions | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Anreiz | Incentives | Allokation | Allocation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
freely available
| Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten) Illustrationen |
|---|---|
| Series: | Barcelona GSE working paper series : working paper. - Barcelona, ZDB-ID 2777474-0. - Vol. no 1024 |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872382