The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games

Burkhard Hehenkamp

Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our findings, in particular that the strategic advantage prevails beyond the classes of super- and submodular games. The application of two-player rent-seeking contests illustrates how our criteria simplify analyzing the strategic advantage. -- strategic advantage ; interdependent preferences ; spillovers ; action monotonicity

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Publisher:	Dortmund : Univ., Wirtschafts- und Sozialwiss. Fak.
Subject:	Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Evolutionäre Spieltheorie \| Evolutionary game theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (18 S.)
Series:	Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge. - Dortmund : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2179681-6. - Vol. 05,05
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/39435 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003891788