The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

Georg Nöldeke, Jorge Peña

We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results confirm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria.

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Year of publication:	August 2015
Authors:	Nöldeke, Georg ; Peña, Jorge
Publisher:	Basel, Switzerland : Universität Basel, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Subject:	Costly voting \| Participation games \| Mixed strategy equilibrium \| Polynomials in Bernstein form \| Wahlverhalten \| Voting behaviour \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Arbeitsgruppe \| Team \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 21 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	WWZ working paper. - Basel : WWZ, ZDB-ID 2259197-7. - Vol. 2015, 08
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/123476 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569666