The use of contract adjustments to lengthen the CEO horizon in the presence of internal and external monitoring
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dikolli, Shane S. ; Kulp, Susan L. ; Sedatole, Karen L. |
Published in: |
Journal of management accounting research : JMAR. - Sarasota, Fla. : Assoc., ISSN 1049-2127, ZDB-ID 1101530-5. - Vol. 25.2013, p. 199-229
|
Subject: | compensation | contracting | monitoring | forward-looking information | corporate governance | Theorie | Theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
-
Engelen, Christian, (2015)
-
CEO pay disparity : efficient contracting or managerial power?
Thi Thanh Nha Vo, (2019)
-
How to control the controller : CEO compensation and motivation
Braendle, Udo C., (2013)
- More ...
-
Transient Institutional Ownership and CEO Contracting
Dikolli, Shane S., (2009)
-
Interrelated performance measures, interactive effort, and incentive weights
Dikolli, Shane S., (2009)
-
INTERRELATED PERFORMANCE MEASURES, INTERACTIVE EFFORT, AND INCENTIVE WEIGHTS
Dikolli, Shane S., (2009)
- More ...