The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts
Year of publication: |
2000
|
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Authors: | Kirstein, Roland ; Voigt, Stefan |
Institutions: | Forschungsstelle zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft |
Subject: | self-enforcing contracts | rule of law | dictatorship | autocracy | Positive Constitutional Economics |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 2000-02 |
Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; P51 - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems ; H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government |
Source: |
-
Constitutions as Equilibria: A Game-theoretic Approach to Positive Constitutional Economics
Kirstein, Roland, (1999)
-
The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts
Kirstein, Roland, (2000)
-
Constitutions as Equilibria: A Game-theoretic Approach to Positive Constitutional Economics
Kirstein, Roland, (1999)
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Constitutions as Equilibria: A Game-theoretic Approach to Positive Constitutional Economics
Kirstein, Roland, (1999)
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Judicial Detection Skill, Litigational Opportunism, and Contractual Compliance
Schmidtchen, Dieter, (1996)
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Schmidtchen, Dieter, (1999)
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