TINBERGEN AND THEIL MEET NASH: CONTROLLABILITY IN POLICY GAMES

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy developed by Tinbergen and Theil to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.

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Year of publication:	2005-04-26
Authors:	Acocella, Nicola ; Bartolomeo, Giovanni Di
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	Policy games \| policy ineffectiveness \| static controllability \| Nash equilibrium existence

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Macroeconomics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf; pages: 9 9 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561226