Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; Acocella, Nicola
Publisher:	Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Wirtschaftspolitik \| Theorie \| Policy games \| policy ineffectiveness \| static controllability \| Nash equilibrium existence

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	Nota di Lavoro ; 132.2005
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	516136496 [GVK] hdl:10419/74181 [Handle] RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.132 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312532