Tournament incentives and institutional ownership
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cheong, Chee Seng ; Yu, Chia-Feng ; Zurbruegg, Ralf ; Brockman, Paul |
Published in: |
International review of economics & finance : IREF. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1059-0560, ZDB-ID 1137476-7. - Vol. 74.2021, p. 418-433
|
Subject: | CEO Pay gap | Corporate tournaments | Institutional holding | Führungskräfte | Managers | Institutioneller Investor | Institutional investor | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Anreiz | Incentives | Schätzung | Estimation |
-
Tournament-based incentives and mergers and acquisitions
Nguyen, Nam H., (2020)
-
Executive compensation tied to ESG performance : international evidence
Cohen, Shira, (2023)
-
CEO compensation, incentive alignment, and carbon transparency
Luo, Le, (2021)
- More ...
-
Phan Hoang Long, (2022)
-
Equity and fixed income markets as drivers of securitised real estate
Cheong, Chee Seng, (2009)
-
Cheong, Chee Seng, (2010)
- More ...