Trade Fragmentation and Coordination in Bilateral Oligopolies.

This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Simple conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium point are provided. In equilibrium, all agents are active on the same markets and prices are identical across markets, so that all equilibria are equivalent to an equilibrium where all agents trade on a single market.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Bloch, F. ; Ferrer, H.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	OLIGOPOLIES \| GAME THEORY \| TRADE

Check Google Scholar |

More access options

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	10 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669218