Transparency and performance evaluation in sequential agency
Year of publication: |
August 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cato, Susumu ; Ishihara, Akifumi |
Published in: |
The journal of law, economics, & organization. - Cary, NC [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 8756-6222, ZDB-ID 634985-7. - Vol. 33.2017, 3, p. 475-506
|
Subject: | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Transparenz | Transparency | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Theorie | Theory |
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