Undermining incentives : CEO reactions to compensation rebalancing
Year of publication: |
June 2018
|
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Authors: | Marsh, John S. ; Graefe-Anderson, Rachel |
Published in: |
Journal of management & governance. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 1385-3457, ZDB-ID 1375940-1. - Vol. 22.2018, 2, p. 365-391
|
Subject: | Behavioral agency theory | Stock options | Executive compensation | Corporate governance | Risk-taking | Führungskräfte | Managers | Aktienoption | Stock option | Corporate Governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Theorie | Theory |
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