UNIFORM CONTINUITY OF THE VALUE OF ZERO-SUM GAMES WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION
We establish uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information, when the distance between changing information fields of each player is measured by the Boylan (1971) pseudo-metric. We also show that the optimal strategy correspondence is upper semicontinuous when the information fields of players change, even with the weak topology on players' strategy sets.
Year of publication: |
2004-03
|
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Authors: | Einy, Ezra ; Haimanko, Ori ; Moreno, Diego ; Shitovitz, Benyamin |
Institutions: | Departamento de EconomÃa, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid |
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