Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function
Year of publication: |
1997
|
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Authors: | Cardona-Coll, Daniel |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 33.1997, 2, p. 101-113
|
Subject: | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Theorie | Theory |
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