Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cardona-Coll, Daniel ; Polanski, Arnold |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 41.2013, 2, p. 217-240
|
Subject: | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory |
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