Voting on Majority Rules
We analyse an overlapping generations model of voting on "reform projects". These resemble investments in that they first require some investment expenditure and later payoff. Since the time during which old people get the benefit is shorter, or because older people are more wealthy and hence pay more taxes, they are more conservative (against reforms) than young people. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2004.
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Messner, Matthias ; Polborn, Mattias K. |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0034-6527. - Vol. 71.2004, 1, p. 115-132
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
freely available
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