Wage Bargaining and Turnover Costs with Heterogeneous Labour: The No-screening Case

We study the effects of mobility costs in a model of wage bargaining between workers and firms, where there is instantaneous matching, free firm entry, heterogeneous labour, and workers' individual productivities are discovered by firms only after being hired. We derive the employment level and the minimum quality standard, in the market solution and in the socially efficient solution.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Strand, J.
Publisher:	Oslo : University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Subject:	wages \| bargaining \| labour market

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Series:	Memorandum ; 14/1998
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	865500584 [GVK] hdl:10419/90801 [Handle] RePEc:hhs:osloec:1998_014 [RePEc]
Classification:	J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; J62 - Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010330294