Was Sarbanes-Oxley costly? : evidence from optimal contracting on CEO compensation
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Gayle, George-Levi ; Li, Chen ; Miller, Robert Allen |
Published in: |
Journal of accounting research. - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1475-679X, ZDB-ID 2060654-0. - Vol. 60.2022, 4, p. 1189-1234
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Subject: | CEO versus shareholders | hidden information | increased agency costs | principal-agent model | reduced conflict of interest | Sarbanes-Oxley Act | set identification | structural estimation | Internes Kontrollsystem | Internal control | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Aktionäre | Shareholders |
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