Weakest-link public goods : giving in-kind or transferring money in a sequential game
Year of publication: |
2001
|
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Authors: | Sandler, Todd ; Vicary, Simon |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 74.2001, 1, p. 71-75
|
Subject: | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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