Weakest-link public goods : giving in-kind or transferring money
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Vicary, Simon ; Sandler, Todd |
Published in: |
European economic review : EER. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921, ZDB-ID 207969-0. - Vol. 46.2002, 8, p. 1501-1520
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Subject: | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Theorie | Theory |
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