When are uninformed boards preferable?
Naoto Isaka
| Year of publication: |
December 2017
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Isaka, Naoto |
| Published in: |
Pacific-Basin finance journal. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0927-538X, ZDB-ID 1343420-2. - Vol. 46.2017, PA, p. 191-211
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| Subject: | Corporate governance | Optimal choice of board of directors | Informed and uninformed boards | Board structure of Japanese firms | Corporate Governance | Vorstand | Executive board | Japan | Board of Directors | Board of directors | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.pacfin.2017.08.003 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011800979