When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dürsch, Peter ; Oechssler, Joerg ; Schipper, Burkhard |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 43.2014, 1, p. 25-36
|
Subject: | Imitation | Tit-for-tat | Decision rules | Learning | Exact potential games | Symmetric games | Repeated games | Relative payoffs | Zero-sum games | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Lernprozess | Learning process | Wiederholte Spiele |
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