When Less Liability Leads to More Care: Adverse Effects of Liability Regimes in Multitask Principal Agent Settings
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Samwer, Martina |
Published in: |
Review of Law & Economics. - Berkeley Electronic Press. - Vol. 4.2008, 2, p. 5-5
|
Publisher: |
Berkeley Electronic Press |
Subject: | principal-agent theory | multitasking | health care | liability law |
-
The Firm as a Socialization Device
Ramalingam, Abhijit, (2010)
-
The impact of liability for malpractice on the optimal reimbursement schemes for health services
Ossig, Sonja, (2004)
-
A note on the comparative statics of pay-for-performance in health care
Sherry, Tisamarie B., (2016)
- More ...
-
Reformansätze in der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung : zwischen Solidarprinzip und Wettbewerb
Samwer, Martina, (2008)
-
Reformansätze in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung : Zwischen Solidarprinzip und Wettbewerb
Samwer, Martina, (2009)
-
Reformansätze in der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung : zwischen Solidarprinzip und Wettbewerb
Samwer, Martina, (2008)
- More ...