Why are CEOs paid for good luck? : an empirical comparison of explanations for pay-for-luck asymmetry
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Campbell, T. Colin ; Thompson, Mary Elizabeth |
Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 35.2015, p. 247-264
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Subject: | Executive compensation | Pay-for-luck | Pay asymmetry | Executive retention | Governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Lohn | Wages |
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