Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? : evidence from debt-equity choice
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Huang, Rong ; Marquardt, Carol A. ; Zhang, Bo |
Published in: |
Review of accounting studies. - Norwell, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 1380-6653, ZDB-ID 1334761-5. - Vol. 19.2014, 2, p. 877-912
|
Subject: | Earnings per share (EPS) | Dilution | Executive compensation | Debt-equity financing | Agency conflicts | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Gewinn | Profit | Schätzung | Estimation | Managervergütung | Kapitalstruktur | Capital structure |
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