Why roll calls? : A model of position-taking in legislative voting and elections
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Snyder, James M. ; Ting, Michael M. |
Published in: |
The journal of law, economics, & organization. - Cary, NC [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 8756-6222, ZDB-ID 634985-7. - Vol. 21.2005, 1, p. 153-178
|
Subject: | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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