Why Roll Calls? A Model of Position-Taking in Legislative Voting and Elections
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Snyder, James M. ; Ting, Michael M. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 153-178, 2005 Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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Why roll calls? : A model of position-taking in legislative voting and elections
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