Why taxing executives' bonuses can foster risk-taking behavior
Year of publication: |
December 2016
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Authors: | Grossmann, Martin ; Lang, Markus ; Dietl, Helmut |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 172.2016, 4, p. 645-664
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Subject: | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Einkommensteuer | Income tax | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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