Winner’s Curse as Social Cost:The Experience of the 3G Mobile Licence Auctions
The bidder who wins at an auction may end up paying more for an asset than it is actually worth. This, stated very simply, is the so-called winner's curse. Consider the simplest possible case where the asset has the same actual value to all bidders, but bidders do not know for certain what that value is. If each bidder independently estimates the value of the asset with error, then the highest bidder will be the bidder who makes the largest positive error in his evaluation of the asset. That positive error is the winner's curse....
Year of publication: |
2003-10-01
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Authors: | Swann, G. M. P. ; Tether, Bruce S. |
Institutions: | Manchester Business School |
Subject: | Technologiemanagement | technology management | Investitionsentscheidung | Lizenzvergabe | Soziale Kosten | Auktionstheorie | auction |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | 489472 bytes 27 p. application/pdf |
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Series: | Working Paper ; No. 454 (2003) |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Classification: | Corporate finance and investment policy. Other aspects ; Study of commerce ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification |
Source: | USB Cologne (business full texts) |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005869984
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