Worker or Shirker - Who Evades More Taxes? A Real Effort Experiment

With the help of a real effort experiment, we analyze if tax evasion depends on the amount of effort invested to generate income. In three treatments, subjects were either endowed with income or had to work moderately or hard to earn it. In line with prospect theory, subjects evaded more taxes when they worked hard for their income. We find little evidence for the prediction that tax evasion in the endowed treatment is higher than in the moderate work treatment

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Bühren, Christoph
Other Persons:	Kundt, Thorben (contributor)
Publisher:	[2013]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Experiment \| Leistungsmotivation \| Work motivation

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (31 p)
Series:	MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 26-2013
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2013 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2284156 [DOI]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; H26 - Tax Evasion
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080069