This paper introduces the possibility of signaling into a finite-depositor version of the Diamond-Dybvig model. More precisely, the decision to keep the funds in the bank is assumed to be unobservable,but depositors are allowed to make it observable by signaling, at a cost. Depositors decide...

We study the effect that the care decision process has on the amount of caring-time and on informal caregiver satisfaction. We develop a theoretical framework in which we compare three two-stage sequential games, each of which corresponds to a different care decision (family, caregiver, and...

We investigate experimentally whether “binding agreements†can provide a solution to the social dilemma that arises in the presence of pure public goods. Signing a binding agreement can prevent players from free riding on the contributions to the public good. However, a well known...

We consider a duopoly market in which two retailers with different reputation compete in prices and one of the retailers is considering selling through a new channel. Consumers are reputation sensitive and averse to the new channel. In addition, the reputation sensitivity and new channel...