Search Results - subject:"stable set"

Political mergers as coalition formation : an analysis of the Heisei municipal amalgamations

Weese, Eric - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 6 (2015) 2, pp. 257-307

In Japan, a formula-based transfer system resulted in local benefits from municipal mergers differing substantially from national benefits. A change in this transfer policy and the mergers that resulted are analyzed using a structural model involving private consumption, public good quality, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757686

Farsighted stability in patent licensing : an abstract game approach

Hirai, Toshiyuki; Watanabe, Naoki; Muto, Shigeo - In: Games and economic behavior 118 (2019), pp. 141-160

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012239086

Theoretical and computational study of several linearisation techniques for binary quadratic problems

Furini, Fabio; Traversi, Emiliano - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012109562

A note on selective line-graphs and partition colorings

Cornaz, Denis; Furini, Fabio; Malaguti, Enrico; … - In: Operations research letters 47 (2019) 6, pp. 565-568

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131870

Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs : a solution in pure strategies

Demuynck, Thomas; Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Saulle, … - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 87 (2019) 2, pp. 147-154

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012133687

Bargaining over an endogenous agenda

Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482

reached as default. These policies form a weakly stable set; and conversely, any weakly stable set is supported by some … the committee implements the ideal policy of the last proposer in a subset of a weakly stable set; but this result does …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599519

Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; McLean, Richard P. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 3, pp. 555-582

establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599522

Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; MacLean, Richard P. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 555-582

establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674216

Bargaining over an endogenous agenda

Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674462

Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; McLean, Richard P. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 3

establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010934643