Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti …-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle …-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency …

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti …-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle …-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency …

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti …-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle …-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency …

We review current methods for calculating fines against cartels in the US and EU, and simulate their deterrence effects … deterrence effects before leniency programs were introduced. Previous simulations of the effects of fines ignore the different … type of deterrence that leniency programs bring about, and, therefore, grossly overstate the minimum fine likely to have …

The paper reviews the recent evolution of leniency programs for cartels in the US and EU, surveys their theoretical … fraud, or corruption - that share with cartels the crucial features that well designed leniency and whistleblower programs … of rewarding whistleblowers in other fields of law enforcement. It concludes with a list of desiderata for leniency and …

Leniency programmes (or policies) reduce sanctions against cartel members that self-report to the Antitrust Authority …. We focus on their ability to directly deter cartels and analogous criminal organizations by undermining internal trust …, increasing individual incentives to ‘cheat’ on partners. Optimally designed ‘courageous’ leniency programmes reward the first …

cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss …The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important … role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between …

We run a market experiment where firms can choose not only their price but also whether to present comparable offers …