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A Product Market Theory of Worker Training
Gersbach, Hans; Schutzler, Armin - 2001
We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their workers. We consider a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262533
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Wage independence in symmetric oligopolistic industries
Dhillon, Amrita; Petrakis, Emmanuel - 1997
This paper provides sufficient conditions under which the negotiated wage in unionized oligopolistic industries with centralized negotiations is independent of a number of product market features (such as the number of firms, the degree of product substitutability, or the type of market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608276
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Oligopsony, Institutions and the Efficiency of General Training
Zoega, Gylfi; Francesconi, Marco; Booth, Alison L. - 2002
In oligopsonistic labour markets, firms have some market power, and a wedge is created between wages and marginal product. When oligopsonistic firms' production technology requires generally trained workers, firms may therefore receive part of the returns to general training and be willing to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262512
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Revisiting the Impact of Union Structures on Wages: Integrating Different Dimensions of Centralisation
Gürtzgen, Nicole - 2003
In a framework of a unionised oligopoly, this paper reconsiders the impact of the bargaining structure on union wages …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297276
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Trade liberalisation and union wages in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly
Gürtzgen, Nicole - 2001
In a framework of a unionised international Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products, this paper analyses national labour market interdependencies and the consequences of trade liberalisation for union wages. The analysis suggests that national wages are likely to be strategic complements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319338
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Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy
Brunello, Giorgio; Graziano, Clara; Parigi, Bruno Maria - 1997
We investigate the determinants of executive pay in a sample of Italian firms. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study on the compensation of Italian executives. We estimate that an increase of real profits per firm by 1 billion lire increases the pay of top executives by only 504...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608323
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Aktienkursorientierte Management-Entlohnung: Ein Wettbewerbshemmnis im Boom?
Neubecker, Leslie - 2001
In the recent research on the effect of stock-based incentive compensation for managers on the degree of collusion … expectations of future demand change over time, managers with stock-based remuneration still have a greater incentive to collude … competition over time. If demand is stochastic, managers can set higher collusive prices in recessions. If demand follows a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305014
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Aktienkursorientierte Management-Entlohnung bei korrelierter Entwicklung der Marktnachfrage
Neubecker, Leslie - 2002
changes stochastically between a high and low growth rate, managers with undeferred stock-based remuneration set prices weakly … procyclically with positive and weakly anticyclically with negative correlation. Deferred compensation induces managers to collude …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305065
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An Analysis of Labour Adjustment Costs in Unionized Economies
Modesto, Leonor; Thomas, Jonathan P. - 2000
In this paper we conduct a theoretical analysis of the implications of a union which can exploit the existence of firm labour adjustment costs. We consider a model involving a large number of identical firms facing a single, economy-wide union. We solve (i) for the Markov perfect equilibria with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262431
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A way of explaining unemployment through a wage-setting game
Tasnádi, Attila - 2003
We investigate a duopsonistic wage-setting game in which the firms have a limited number of workplaces. We assume that the firms have heterogeneous productivity, that there are two types of workers with different reservation wages and that a worker's productivity is independent of his type. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263101