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Does say on pay matter? : evidence from Germany
Tröger, Tobias; Walz, Uwe - 2019
We analyze a hand-collected dataset of 1682 executive compensation packages at 34 firms included in the main German stock market index (DAX) for the years 2009-2017 in order to investigate the impact of the 2009 say on pay legislation. The findings provide important insights beyond the German...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061896
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An activist view of CEO compensation
Baum, Alex; Hale, Robert; Morfit, Mason; Larcker, David F. - 2017
Understanding CEO compensation plans is a continuing challenge for directors and investors. The disclosure of these plans is dictated by SEC rules that rely heavily on the “fair value” of awards at the time they are granted. The problem with these numbers is that they are static and do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011870307
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Outside Director Independence, Auditor Independence and Executive Cash Bonus Compensation
Watrin, Christoph - 2010
This paper examines the association between managers' cash bonuses and discretionary accounting choices in a sample of … German stock corporations from 2005 to 2007. We investigate managers' earnings management behavior with respect to their …-increasing accounting choices by managers. In line with prior research, auditor independence is proxied by the amount of non-audit service …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013149997
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Non-mandatory say on pay votes and AGM participation : evidence from Germany
Powell, Daniel; Rapp, Marc Steffen - 2015 - Preliminary Version as of 1 June 2015
Since August 2009, German legislation allows for voluntary Say on Pay Votes (SoPV) during Annual General Meetings (AGMs). We examine 1,169 AGMs of all German listed firms with more than 10,000 agenda items over the period 2010-2013 to identify (1) determinants and approval rates of voluntary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010530578
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Restricting CEO Pay
Dittmann, Ingolf - 2011
We analyze several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrate two models of executive compensation that describe how firms would react to different types of restrictions. We find that many restrictions would have unintended consequences. Restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013133096
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Agency Problem II and Convergence in CEO Pay
Haman, Janto - 2012
Convergence in CEO pay occurs when pay differentials narrow over time. We analyze and compare differences in the rate of convergence in CEO pay of Australian listed firms with high shareholding concentration (HSC) and without, for the period 1992 to 2009. We find zero and negative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097908
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Evidence-Based Executive Pay : Remunerating for Shareholder Value
Wilson, Amanda - 2013
Prevailing executive pay practices rest on fallacious assumptions about performance attribution, the nature of alignment, and the psychology of incentives, and have numerous unintended consequences that are value-destructive particularly for long term and diversified shareholders. The focus of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086295
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Seven Myths of Executive Compensation
Larcker, David F. - 2013
Executive compensation has become one of the most contentious topics in corporate governance. However, public perception about executive pay suffers from many misconceptions. These include the notions that:1. The ratio of CEO-to-average-worker pay is a useful statistic:2. Compensation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092778
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Incentive Alignment through Performance-Focused Shareholder Proposals on Management Compensation
Fortin, Steve - 2014
. We find that: (1) PSP sponsors successfully identify firms that suffer from a misalignment of managers and shareholders …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066953
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Corporate Lobbying and CEO Pay
Skaife, Hollis Ashbaugh - 2013
This study examines the agency costs of corporate lobbying by exploring the relation between lobbying and excess CEO compensation. We show that CEOs of firms engaged in lobbying earn significantly greater compensation levels compared to CEOs in non-lobbying firms, after controlling for standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074468