's core business and explorative inventions. It implies that managers diversify their innovation portfolios and decrease …We investigate how CEO's risk incentive (vega) affects firm innovation. To establish causality, we exploit compensation … identification tests indicate a positive and causal effect of CEOs' vega on innovation activities. Furthermore, dampened managerial …

We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and innovation. In an empirical … examination of compensation contracts of S&P 400, 500, and 600 firms we find that long-term incentives in the form of options are … positively related to patents and citations to patents. In addition, convexity of options has a positive effect on innovation. We …

-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence … between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the model to individual CEO data and show that it can explain … with the almost uniform use of at-the-money stock options. We conclude that the provision of risk-taking incentives is a …

. We find that: (1) PSP sponsors successfully identify firms that suffer from a misalignment of managers and shareholders …

that stronger trademark protection induces firms to increase their CEO risk-taking incentives as measured by CEO portfolio … after the passage of the FTDA. Overall, our findings suggest that shareholders provide more incentives in the compensation …

This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent … governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost …-cutting effort and investigate the consequences of and the incentives for coordinating managerial pay among corporate boards …

This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent … governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost …-cutting effort and investigate the consequences of and the incentives for coordinating managerial pay among corporate boards. …

We provide evidence that CEO equity incentives, especially stock options, influence stock liquidity risk via …