In a self-confining equilibrium, each player's strategy is a best response to his beliefs about the play of his opponents and each player's beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of play. Thus, if a self-confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly, no player ever observes play that...

This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. The authors obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's...

The authors study the steady states of a system in which players learn about the strategies their opponents are playing by updating their Bayesian priors in light of their observations. Players are matched.at random to play a fixed extensive-form game and each player observes the realized...

The authors examine the following paradox: in a dynamic setting, equilibria can be radically different in a model with a finite number of agents than in a model with a continuum of agents. They present a simple strategic setting in which this paradox is a general phenomenon. However, the paradox...

In a monetary model, it is shown that if there is a unique Pareto inefficient barter equilibrium, then a monetary equilibrium exists when traders are sufficiently patient. Copyright 1989 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

The authors develop a theory of general equilibrium with endogenous debt limits in the form of individual rationality constraints similar to those in the dynamic consistency literature. If an agent defaults on a contract, he can be excluded from future contingent claims markets trading and can...

We propose that a simple ?dual-self? model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and Rabin?s paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The model also implies that...