We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium...

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to analyze the compatibility between entrepreneurial and social attitudes. Specifically, it seeks to analyze whether subjects with a more developed economic entrepreneurial attitude exhibit a less social attitude. Design/methodology/approach – The...

Purpose – This paper aims to analyze the role played by two dimensions of entrepreneurs' private social capital in the survival, growth and innovativeness of entrepreneurial service ventures: local size and preferential attachment degree. Design/methodology/approach – Data were collected by...

In many economic situations, a player pursues coordination or anti-coordination with her neighbors on a network, but she also has intrinsic preferences among the available options. We here introduce a model which allows to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players...

This paper constructs the equilibrium for a specific code that can be seen as a “universal grammar” in a class of common interest Sender–Receiver games where players communicate through a noisy channel. We propose a Senderʼs signaling strategy which does not depend on either the game...

This paper compares two alternative methodologies—the experimental–behavioral approach and the contingent approach—for measuring the value that an attribute of a good (product or service) creates for potential customers. In the experimental–behavioral methodology, potential buyers make...

This article shows the results of experiments where subjects play the Schelling’s spatial proximity model. Two types of experiments are conducted: one in which choices are made sequentially and a variation of the first where the decision making is simultaneous. The results of the...

This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design of both communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by bounded rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both theories...