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We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modeling interdependent preferences distinguishing between "payoff types" and "belief types" and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation...
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Stochastic fictitious play (SFP) assumes that agents do not try to influence the future play of their current opponents, an assumption that is justified by appeal to a setting with a large population of players who are randomly matched to play the game. However, the dynamics of SFP have only...
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Average options are path-dependent and have payoffs which depend on the average price over a fixed period leading up to the maturity date. This option is of interest and important for thinly-traded assets since price manipulation is prohibited, and both the investor and issuer may enjoy a...
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Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private-monitoring perturbations. We show that with full support of public signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust if...
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We introduce a “dynamic non-equivalent utilities” (DNEU) condition and the notion of dynamic player-specific punishments for a general repeated game with unequal discounting, both naturally generalizing the stationary counterparts in Abreu et al. (1994). We show that if the DNEU condition,...
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This paper provides a dual characterization of the existing ones for the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in a class of finite stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg et al. (1994),...
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