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Sequential Equilibria with Infinite Histories

Phelan, Christopher; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

A fundamental non-stationarity of infinitely repeated games as usually studied is that the length of the history of play gets longer each period. With private actions (and mixed strategies) or private signals, this introduces a particular difficulty with common solution concepts such as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051213

The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions

Sannikov, Yuliy; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

We show that the ways incentives can be provided during dynamic interaction depend very crucially on the manner in which players learn information. This conclusion is established in a general stationary environment with noisy public monitoring and frequent actions. The monitoring process can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051223

Career Dynamics Under Uncertainty: Estimating the Value of Firm Experimentation

Pastorino, Elena - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2005

This paper develops and structurally estimates a learning model in which firms acquire information about workers … jobs and firms. Because of the trade--off between learning and short--run profit maximization, a firm's optimal job … learning model can succeed in fitting the dynamic pattern of separations, promotions and demotions, and individual wage …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090831

Optimal Job Design and Career Dynamics in the Presence of Uncertainty

Pastorino, Elena - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004

This paper investigates a learning model in which information about a worker's ability, unobserved to both the worker … requires. We then examine the strategic effects of the dynamics of learning on a worker's career profile. We prove that price …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090887