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Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Nakamura, Toshifumi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319

Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Sotomayor, Marilda - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851337

Education, Matching and the Allocative Value of Romance

Booth, A. L.; Coles, Melvyn - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

decisions of partnered couples. We consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities - one where … generates greater investment eficiency, romantic matching generates greater allocative efficiency, since more high ability … educational investments and labor force participation based on matching regimes. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851358

A Many-to-Many "Rural Hospital Theorem"

Klijn, Flip; Yazici, Ayse - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851401

Median Stable Matching for College Admission

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851408

Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation

Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851415

The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria

Jaume, Daniel; Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851453

Endogenous Matching in University-Industry Collaboration: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the UK

Banal-Estañol, Albert; Macho-Stadler, Inés; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

We develop a two-sided matching model to analyze collaboration between heterogeneous academics and ﬁrms. We predict a … positive assortative matching in terms of both scientiﬁc ability and aﬃnity for type of research, but negative assortative in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019699

Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547122

Constrained School Choice

Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547129