Similar Search Results

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272716

Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567

The Old Boy Network: Gender Differences in the Impact of Social Networks on Remuneration in Top Executive Jobs

Lalanne, Marie; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Using an original dataset describing the career history of some 16,000 senior executives and members of the non-executive board of US, UK, French and German companies, we investigate gender differences in the use of social networks and their impact on earnings. There is a large gender wage gap:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009351518

Professional Network and Career Coevolution

Berardi, Nicoletta; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

This paper examines how networks of professional contacts contribute to the development of the careers of executives of European and US companies. We build a dynamic model of career progression in which career moves both depend upon existing networks and contribute to the development of future...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009359489

Executive Compensation and Stock Options: An Inconvenient Truth

Danthine, Jean-Pierre; Donaldson, John B - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

to be incompatible with the fact that the bulk of many high-profile managers' compensation is in the form of various …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666708

Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behaviour

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits – as revealed by the empirical literature on ‘income smoothing … termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor, independent of contracts’ duration. When managers have …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667065

Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors

Cuñat, Vicente; Guadalupe, Maria - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper studies the effect of product market competition on the compensation packages that firms offer to their executives and in particular its impact on the sensitivity of pay to performance. To measure the effect of competition we use two different identification strategies on a panel of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791281

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509464