Similar Search Results

Front-running by Mutual Fund Managers: It ain't that Bad

Danthine, Jean-Pierre; Moresi, Serge X - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

This paper evaluates the welfare implications of front-running by mutual fund managers. It extends the model of Kyle …-tradable or illiquid assets. The insider with trade-information is one of the fund managers. We find that front-running activity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123513

Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control

Bodnaruk, Andriy; Massa, Massimo; Simonov, Andrei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We study holdings in M&A targets by financial conglomerates which affiliated investment banks advise the bidders. We show that advisors take positions in the targets before M&A announcements. These stakes are positively related to the probability of observing the bid and to the target premium....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123703

Information Sales and Insider Trading

Cespa, Giovanni - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good. Hence, the effects of its incorporation into stock prices depend on who is the agent controlling its flow. Similarly to a durable goods monopolist, a monopolistic analyst selling information intertemporally competes against...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067575

The Dog that Did Not Bark: Insider Trading and Crashes

Vigueras, Marín; Maria, José; Olivier, Jacques - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper documents that at the individual stock level insiders sales peak many months before a large drop in the stock price, while insiders purchases peak only the month before a large jump. We provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on trading constraints and asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666589

Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behaviour

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits – as revealed by the empirical literature on ‘income smoothing … termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor, independent of contracts’ duration. When managers have …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667065

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

The Old Boy Network: Gender Differences in the Impact of Social Networks on Remuneration in Top Executive Jobs

Lalanne, Marie; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Using an original dataset describing the career history of some 16,000 senior executives and members of the non-executive board of US, UK, French and German companies, we investigate gender differences in the use of social networks and their impact on earnings. There is a large gender wage gap:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009351518

Professional Network and Career Coevolution

Berardi, Nicoletta; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

This paper examines how networks of professional contacts contribute to the development of the careers of executives of European and US companies. We build a dynamic model of career progression in which career moves both depend upon existing networks and contribute to the development of future...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009359489

Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769