instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

dispersion of wages increase with competition using a large panel of United Kingdom workers with complete work histories. I …

wages. For white-collar wages the following picture emerges: more dispersion leads to higher earnings up to some point where … the relation changes direction. For blue-collar wages we find a positive association between dispersion and standardized … wages between firms, but no relation within firms over time. For employment growth the results are ambiguous. …

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …

managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits – as revealed by the empirical literature on ‘income smoothing … termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor, independent of contracts’ duration. When managers have …