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The Choice of Honesty: An Experiment Regarding Heterogeneous Responses to Situational Social Norms
Gibson, Rajna; Tanner, Carmen; Wagner, Alexander F - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
We conduct a laboratory experiment in which we expose participants to situational social norms of approval or disapproval of lying. While participants on average conform to the situational pressure, the results highlight important differences in individual reactions. Situational norms crowd out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145452
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Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Albuquerque, Rui; Durnev, Artyom; Koskinen, Yrjö - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
This paper presents an industry equilibrium model where firms can choose to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We model CSR activities as an investment in customer loyalty and show that CSR decreases systematic risk and increases firm value. These effects are stronger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083749
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Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking
Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769
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Active Agents, Passive Principals: Does High-Powered CEO Compensation Really Improve Incentives
Dow, James; Raposo, Clara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
In this Paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the CEO in the formulation of corporate strategy. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504388
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Returns to Inventors
Toivanen, Otto; Väänänen, Lotta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
A key input to inventive activity is human capital. Hence it is important to understand the monetary incentives of inventors. We estimate the effect of patented inventions on individual earnings by linking data on U.S. patents and their inventors to Finnish employer-employee data. Returns are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530342
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Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272716
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Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation
Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567
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The Old Boy Network: Gender Differences in the Impact of Social Networks on Remuneration in Top Executive Jobs
Lalanne, Marie; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Using an original dataset describing the career history of some 16,000 senior executives and members of the non-executive board of US, UK, French and German companies, we investigate gender differences in the use of social networks and their impact on earnings. There is a large gender wage gap:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009351518