The purpose on this paper is twofold. First, we present an alternative model of agglomeration and trade that displays the main features of the recent economic geography literature while allowing for the derivation of analytical results by means of simple algebra. Second, we show how this...

There are two principal theories of why countries trade: comparative advantage and increasing returns to scale. Yet there is no empirical work that assesses the relative importance of these two theories in accounting for production structure and trade. We use a framework that nests an increasing...

This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Simple conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium point are provided. In equilibrium, all agents are active on the same markets and prices are identical across markets, so that all...

We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of horizontal product differentiation. We characterise the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna. We show that a foreign producer would choose a...

We consider the two-stage game proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman in the adress model of horizontal differenciation developed by Hotelling. Firms choose capacities in the first stage and then compete in price. We show that capacity precommitment softens price competitio drastically.

This paper examines the potential for success for trade-focused regional integration agreements in sub-Saharan Africa, with a particular focus on southern Africa. The paper surveys the eexisting literature on regional integration, and attempts to distill the most relevant lessons about success...

This paper describes the changing economic environments being experienced by Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries as they move from relatively controlled and closed economies, to more open and liberalized economies with wider regional trade arrangements, deepening trade cooperation, and expanding...

This paper provides a methodology to study coalition formation problems with externalities and heterogeneous players, whensome subset of the players can act as "coalition developers" over time. The framework provided here allows to explicitly predict the timing of admission to coalitions, the...

In this paper, we analyze the trade war between two large countries when the trade policy is decided through majority voting. We show how the trade war equilibrium depends on the median voter production factor relative endowment. We compare this equilibrium to the one analyzed by Johnson where...