In this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric … information. In a three- tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a … information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents. The main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a …

and information asymmetry is modelled. A repeated investment-production game with coordinator commitment in supplier …'s investment addresses the information sharing and asset- specific investment problem. We provide a mitigation of the hold …-up problem on the investment cost observed by the supplier and an instrument for truthful revelation of private information by …

use of industry-commissioned consultants, experts and lobbyists that produce information for regulatory and policy use. A … firm and regulator, linked to the role of the regulator as information-processing intermediate for the political principal …. The firm puts processed but biased information at the free disposal of the regulator, 'no strings attached', who can then …

criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomlete information game. …