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Colonial legacy, linguistic disenfranchisement and the civil conflict in Sri Lanka
CASTANEDA DOWER, Paul; GINSBURGH, Victor; WEBER, Shlomo - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014
conflict, heavily rely on mechanisms of group identification and often use somewhat arbitrary divisions of a society into … the experience of violence throughout the conflict episode. By examining the protracted war in Sri Lanka and applying … these indices (and their combination) to a data set describing victims of the civil conflict by district and year, we are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011246325
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On efficiency and sustainability in a collective decision-making problem with heterogeneous agents
HAIMANKO, Ori; LE BRETON, Michel; WEBER, Shlomo - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2002
In this paper we examine a collective decision problem, where the set of heterogeneous individuals is partitioned into several groups, each choosing its own policy (e.g., location of a public project) from the given policy space. We first consider the notion of "efficient" partition that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008591
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Household behavior and individual autonomy: An extended Lindahl mechanism
D’ASPREMONT, Claude; DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2012
We present a comprehensive model of household economic decision covering both fully cooperative and non-cooperative cases as well as semi- cooperative cases, varying with income distribution and a parameter vector ÷ representing degrees of individual autonomy with respect to the public goods....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610477
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Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods
ALBOTH, Dirk; LERNER, Anat; SHALEV, Jonathan - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1998
A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008302
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Household behavior and individual autonomy
d’ASPREMONT, Claude; DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550172
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Profit Maximising in Auctions of Public Goods.
Alboth, D.; Lerner, A.; Shalev, J. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1998
A profit maximising auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779432
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Auctionning Public Goods to Groups of Agents.
Alboth, D.; Lerner, A.; Shalev, J. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1997
A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779435
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Coalition formation in a global warming game : how the design of protocols affects the success of environmental treaty-making
EYCKMANS, Johan; FINUS, Michael - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003
We combine the newest concepts o non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We consider three coalition games that allow for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043184
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Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules
BOGOMOLNAIA, Anna; LE BRETON, Michel; SAVVATEEV, Alexei; … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005
In this paper we consider a model with multiple jurisdictions where each formed jurisdiction selects a public project from the given uni-dimensional set, equally shares its cost among its members and places the project at the location of its median resident. We examine a cooperative concept of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043420
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The egalitarian sharing rule in provision of public projects
BOGOMOLNAIA, Anna; LE BRETON, Michel; SAVVATEEV, Alexei; … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043439