In this paper we consider a new analytic center cutting plane method in a projective space. We prove the efficiency estimates for the general schemeand show that these results can be used in the analysis of a feasibility problem, the variational inequality problem and the problem of constrained...

The appearance of the normal density remained unexplained in Mertens and Zamir's proof: it appeared there as the solution of a differential equation. Our proof however justifies this normal density as a consequence of a generalisation of the CLT discussed in the second part of this paper.

In Van den Akker, Van Hoesel, and Savelsbergh (1994), we have studied a time-indexed formulation for single-machine scheduling problems and have presented a complete characterization of all facet inducing inequalities with right-hand side 1 and 2 for the convex hull of the monotone extension of...

We develop an aggregated model to study rational environmental adaptation policies that compensate negative consequences of certain environmental hazards and changes. The model distinguishes three categories of adaptation measures that (a) compensate the decrease of the environmental amenity...

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...

In the first part of this paper we prove that the global quadratic optimization problem over a simplex can be solved with a constant relative accuracy. In the second part we consider some natural extensions of the result.

In this paper, I first prove an integral representation theorem: Every quasi-integral on a Stone lattice can be represented by a unique upper-continuous capacity. I then apply this representation theorem to study the topological structure of the space of all upper-continuous capacities on a...

A profit maximising auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...

This paper presents a combinatorial polynomial-time algorithm for minimizing submodular set functions. The algorithm employs a scaling scheme that uses a flow in the complete directed graph on the underlying set with each arc capacity equal to the scaled parameter.

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...