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Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence from the European Union

Allain, Marie-Laure; Boyer, Marcel; Kotchoni, Rachidi; … - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2013

Deterring the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of antitrust policy. We develop a dynamic …. Dissuader la formation ou le maintien des cartels est un objectif important de la politique antitrust. Nous développons un cadre … détection et de conviction. Nous montrons que la prise en compte appropriée de la dynamique des cartels joue un rôle clé dans la …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183779

Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive: Experimental Evidence

Charness, Gary; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2011

be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833344

The Econometrics of Cartel Overcharges

Boyer, Marcel; Kotchoni, Rachidi - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2011

49%. By examining more sources, Connor (2010b) finds a median of 23.3% for all type of cartels and a mean of 50.4% for … successful cartels. However, the data used in these studies are estimates rather than true observations, since the true illegal … profits of cartels are rarely observable. Therefore, these data are subject to model error, estimation error and publication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008877009

The Determination of Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases - The Myth of Underdeterrence

Allain, Marie-Laure; Boyer, Marcel; Kotchoni, Rachidi; … - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2011

The determination of optimal fines to deter the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of … détermination d'amendes optimales pour dissuader la formation ou la poursuite des cartels est au cur des politiques de concurrence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008877010

Strategically Planned Behavior in Public Good Experiments

Keser, Claudia - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2000

Subjects submitted strategies for playing a public good game. The strategies interacted with each other in a computer simulation. They could be revised and resubmitted for a second and a third simulation round. The strategies' average contribution to the public good increased from one simulation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100527

Voluntary Contributions to Reduce Expected Public Losses

Keser, Claudia; Montmarquette, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2002

In this experimental study we examine behavior relating to voluntary contributions to reduce expected losses associated, for example, with the occurrence of natural disasters or major industrial accidents. We ask subjects to allocate tokens between a private investment and a public investment....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100545

Tax Evasion and Social Interactions

Fortin, Bernard; Lacroix, Guy; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski's (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account social conformity effects (i.e., endogenous interactions), fairness effects (i.e., exogenous interactions) and sorting effects (i.e., correlated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100598

Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?

Coricelli, Giorgio; Joffily, Mateus; Montmarquette, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2007

experiment shows that emotional arousal, measured by Skin Conductance Responses, increases in the proportion of evaded taxes. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100604

Overbidding in Independant Private-Values Auctions and Misperception of Probabilities

Armantier, Olivier; Treich, Nicolas - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2006

We conduct an experiment to test whether probability misperception may be a possible alternative to risk aversion to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100674

Who Gets the Last Word? An Experimental Study of the Effect of a Peer Review Process on the Expression of Social Norms

Engle-Warnick, Jim; Leibbrandt, Andreas - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2006

We alter who gets the last word on the outcome in three different types of trust games: the first mover, the second mover, or, a committee comprised of first and second movers. The committee functions in a manner similar to a peer review process, in which experienced subjects pass judgment on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100807