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Rosaz, Julie; Slonim, Robert; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

precise feedback on the co-worker's output, and also vary whether the two workers can communicate. We find that allowing … working conditions causes workers to quit at more similar times. When, and only when, communication is allowed, workers are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279313

"Making It Count": Evidence from a Field Study on Assessment Rules, Study Incentives and Student Performance

Chevalier, Arnaud; Dolton, Peter; Lührmann, Melanie - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

This paper examines a quasi-experiment in which we encourage student effort by setting various weekly incentives to engage in online tests. Our identification strategy exploits i) weekly variation in incentives to determine their impact on student effort, and ii) controlled cross-group variation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959631

Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … the production period, and continuously updated feedback. The pay schemes are a piece rate payment scheme and a winner …-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703358

Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822892

Subjective Evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility

Fuchs, William - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013

worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010720080

Does Bargaining Matter in the Small Firm Matching Model?

L'Haridon, Olivier; Malherbet, Franck; Pérez-Duarte, … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

In this article, we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm’s matching model of unemployment. To the best of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008564709

An Economic Model of Child Custody

Francesconi, Marco; Muthoo, Abhinay - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003

This paper develops a model of child custody based on an incomplete-contract approach to the allocation of property rights. Because of the presence of transaction costs in marriage, altruistic parents cannot contract upon the investments they make into their children, but can reduce the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703298

Are Voluntary Agreements Better? Evidence from Baseball Arbitration

Budd, John W.; Sojourner, Aaron J.; Jung, Jaewoo - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

This paper empirically examines the widespread belief that voluntarily negotiated agreements produce better long-run relationships than third-party imposed settlements, such as arbitrator decisions or court judgments. Two key outcomes are analyzed – subsequent player performance and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010761634

Pro-Social Missions and Worker Motivation: An Experimental Study

Fehrler, Sebastian; Kosfeld, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

mission-oriented organizations is important to explain empirical findings of lower wages and high motivation in the latter. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279260

Incentives and Group Identity

Masella, Paolo; Meier, Stephan; Zahn, Philipp - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

This paper investigates in a principal-agent environment whether and how group membership influences the effectiveness of incentives and when incentives can have “hidden costs”, i.e., a detrimental effect. We show experimentally that in all interactions control mechanisms can have hidden...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011252294